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Again, on my plan

In Economics on September 21, 2009 at 1:30 pm

obama_economy

About a year ago, I sketched a plan to get the banks back into health.  Its principle was simple:  Instead of handing out massive amounts of cash to the banks with tons of toxic assets clogging their balance sheets, in the hope that that they restart lending, hand the money directly to the so-called “subprime” borrowers so that they continue to service their mortgages.   At the time, it sounded utopian, even silly — because the political clout to push for it, let alone to force its implementation was non-existent.  Even now, the political force that is required to place this plan in the agenda is still in its embryonic stages, but I believe it is gradually building up.

In this post (in my otherwise neglected blog), I just want to report that — aside from Joseph Stiglitz — there’s another reputed economist just coming around to my approach: Steve Keen.   The neat thing is that, unlike me, who only enunciated a principle and sketched the idea, Keen has taken the trouble to model and calibrate carefully the effects of the alternative plan.

And, in regards to the build up of the political force referred above, I will refer you to Arianna Huffington’s review of Michael Moore’s new movie, Capitalism: A Love Story.

[Image borrowed from The Black Commentator: http://www.blackcommentator.com.]

Making Obama do it

In Economics, Politics on January 9, 2009 at 11:17 am

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. tells the story of FDR approached by people who wanted the U.S. to increase its involvement in confronting Hitler in Europe.  FDR replied to them:

“I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.”

This is how the president tacitly assigned to them the task of bringing their case directly to the U.S. people, at the time hesitant about taking a bigger part in the European conflict.  If the national attitude towards the conflict shifted, FDR would “follow” suit.

If we check our hopes and illusions at the door, it is far from clear at this point the extent to which Obama is truly committed to promoting a progressive agenda in the U.S. and the globe.  The opportunity is definitely there.  But, consider — for example — his choice of economic cabinet.   The people he’s recruited are, to put it mildly, not known as strong reformers.  In the management of the economy, people like Austan Goolsbee, Tim Geithner, Larry Summers, and — in the background — Robert Rubin, people who have advocated the type of policies associated with the lead to the current economic disaster, have been tapped and are actively shaping up Obama’s economic plan.

Others, like Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, James Galbraith, and Dean Baker, have been largely ignored, in spite of the fact that they were critical of the policy climate that led to the current crisis, and that they have been forceful advocating measures to fight the crisis that place the broader public interest, the interest of working- and middle-class people, at the center of these policies.

In today’s New York Times, Paul Krugman continues to speak his mind about the timidity of Obama’s plans, in stark contrast with the urgency of his words.  Basic arithmetic indicates that, in the current conditions, a less than 1 trillion dollar “stimulus” is insufficient to move a 15-trillion dollar economy and tax cuts (especially tax cuts for large businesses) are largely wasted resources, because their “bang for the buck” is significantly smaller than that of a dollar directly spent.  (Apparently, even strongly pro-establishment Democrats of the Nancy Pelosi type oppose Obama’s intention of not phasing out the tax cuts for the rich that W. Bush passed!)  Yes, there’s uncertainty, but — precisely — the nature of economic uncertainty during a crisis is such that timidity in the response is the greater evil.

The excuse, as Krugman suggests, seems to be political.  Like Krugman, I’m deeply skeptical of Obama’s alleged approach.  It seems, for what we know, that Obama wants to have a large majority behind his actions, including a solid support in Congress, which requires compromising with staunch Republicans.  By temperament — the press has been telling us — Obama prefers a pragmatic focus on solutions, rather than political confrontation.

That is fine as long as the interest of the majority of working- Americans is truly the top priority.  As a tactical stance at this point, there’s nothing wrong in principle with opening the tent to more people.  But, if history is any guide, the special interests that oppose the economic security of working Americans, the reform of our disfunctional health care system, the reform of our foreign policy, etc. won’t be pacified with friendly gestures.

If Obama begins to compromise to them, always at our expense, they will only confirm that stiffening their opposition works.  Just like in economics, tax incidence is avoided by those more willing to walk away from a market deal, and falls on those forced to take it; in politics, the stubborn prevails and the compromising paints himself into a corner.  This is not an argument in favor of partisanship for partisanship’s sake.  It’s an argument in favor of partisanship to advance the public interest.

Ultimately, it is not an ideological disagreement, but the clash of their vested interests against the needs and interests of the majority of Americans which makes the right wingers so stubborn that only the effective derailment of the popular effort that gave Obama his victory, can pacify them.

Obama has said that he’ll listen to the people.  During his campaign, he emphasized that his election was not about him, but about us, rank-and-file Americans.  We need to test his claim continuously, from the get-go.  Let’s press on.  After all, we’re fired up and ready to go.  So, let’s bring the discussion to our relatives, friends, neighbors, coworkers, and everybody willing to engage in a conversation with us.  Let’s use all means at hand to impress upon the new administration that we’re stubborn in demanding satisfaction to our needs as working- and middle-class Americans.

Let’s make him do it!

[UPDATE 1/10/2009: Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein, from Obama's economic team, have estimated the impact of Obama's plan (AARP) on employment.  Since they admit that the impact of the plan as presented is rather underwhelming, they seem to be asking us to make them do more.]

[UPDATE 1/13/2009: John Nichols, a The Nation correspondent, has followed Obama closely.  Here's his view on how to push him to the left: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/01/12-9]

Minneapolis vs. Boston

In Economics on January 3, 2009 at 2:05 pm

fed

In an October 2008 paper, V.V. Chari, Lawrence Christiano, and Patrick J. Kehoe (Fed Minneapolis, CCK) found no evidence of a crunch affecting interbank credit or borrowing by Main Street.  They argue that Main Street’s cost of borrowing is not as high as a quick look at spreads would suggest; that we should look at the levels instead.

In a November 2008 paper, Ethan Cohen-Cole, Burcu Duygan-Bump, Jose Fillat, and Judit Montoriol-Garriga (Fed Boston, CDFM) replied in detail to the arguments in the CCK paper and concluded that Main Street is indeed being hit by a credit crunch.  I am just starting to read the latter, but I didn’t find the CCK view convincing to begin with.  I’ll say why below.

My sixth sense tells me that the political implications of what CCK are arguing are relevant.  What they are really suggesting with their paper is that large public efforts to get the economy moving are not called for, especially those directed to support employment.  It’s the old let-the-markets-sort-things-out shibboleth.

From my standpoint, the main issue is the net (dynamic) distributional effect of the measures taken and to be taken (by the new administration) with the alleged aim of shoring up the financial and non-financial sectors of the economy.   Among the different possible ways in which the financial sector can be rescued, I believe that, on equity as well as on efficiency grounds, it can be argued that the best approach is the direct relief to working- and middle-class borrowers via methods that put the public interest first at the expense of the captains of finance that drove us into the ditch.

I’ll just say, to be more specific, that I favor the outright nationalization of, at least, the weakest banks, followed by the re-negotiation and direct extension of new loans to lower income individuals and small businesses by the nationalized banks.  With Fannie and Freedie re-nationalized, the mortgage market can be fixed and revived provided the political will is there.

Following Michael Moore, I also favor a similar type of nationalization of troubled industries, like car making, and the realignment of priorities  of those companies to serve the public interest, particularly in the areas of environmental sustainability and workers’ interests.

Having said that about the politics of the issue, I now return to the empirical debate mentioned above.

In the CCK paper, I find one argument utterly unconvincing, namely that spreads (the difference between the interest rates at which banks, business, or people borrow and the baseline interest rates, those of assets deemed relatively risk-free by the markets, like the federal funds rate or LIBOR) are not informative of the existence of a credit crunch.

It seems to me that  the exact opposite is true. I expect all rate levels to be dragged down to some extent by the monetary policy reactions to the crisis: lower federal funds rate and discount (the latter being the rate at which U.S. banks can borrow from the Fed). The issue is how the risk, term, liquidity, and information structures of the interest rate react to monetary policy moves.  And, at that, the spreads tell the story.  And spreads for the credit instruments available on Main Street have gone through the roof.  The flight to quality (i.e. the flight to Treasuries) is the credit crunch!

A credit crunch doesn’t mean that liquid wealth (money) won’t find any parking spot at all.  It simply means that all regular parking spots are suddenly deemed unbearable by lenders and that the hurdle rates at those spots vis-a-vis the seemingly riskless rate increase accordingly.  Parked in Treasuries, wealth will earn the baseline interest as small as it may be now.   So, it’ll be like cash (not entirely, because it’s not fully liquid, but almost), except that it will earn some token interest.

On the other hand, loaning wealth to yours truly would be an act of unbelievable foolishness.  Evidence of the credit crunch is not that the overall rate at which I’d be borrowing now is relatively low (assuming that the market where I can borrow exists, a rather heroic assumption nowadays), but the difference between what I’d have to pay in interest and what the federal government does pay in interest.

In any case, if the tons of base money (the additional reserves the Fed loans to banks via discount window or that end up in the banks whenever the Fed buys Treasuries in the open market) that the Fed has been injecting into the banking system as of late had already translated into streams of credit to average Joes like me, then we’d be observing them in the data on deposits or measures of the money stock (M1 or M2).  Here, I only see a minuscule jump in deposits, M1 and M2 in September and October.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/Current/

On the other hand,  take a look at what happened to bank reserves:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/Current/

In words, in September and October 2008, bank reserves went straight up.  More specifically, they more than doubled and more than tripled, respectively.  On the other hand, total deposits and M measures in the same periods only experienced a tiny increase.  Up to the latest data point available, reserves have been building up much faster than total deposits or Ms have gone up.   That does it for me.

I understand that businesses have other ways to raise cash than issuing commercial paper or knocking on a banks’ door.  But these aggregate data show clearly, to my lights, that banks have not been lending at anything near the pace at which they have expanded their reserves.  Have other forms of cash raising picked up the slack left by debt?  The state of the stock markets in the last few months doesn’t suggest that.  So, chances are, Main Street businesses are under strife while banks have frozen lots of new credit lines, and recalled old ones, as fast as they have been able to, and now sit on a bunch of idle base money.

How can this be?  Don’t banks lose the “risk-free” federal funds rate by holding reserves beyond what they are required to hold, since reserves are just electronic credits recorded on the Fed banks?  Well, a zero interest rate still beats the negative returns that banks fear if they were to loosen their purse.

To translate into new deposits (money in the economy), the base money injected by the Fed needs to be loaned, thus expanding total deposits and the Ms via the multiplier mechanism. It didn’t happen. It’s not happening.  The money multiplier has dropped.  And since credit is the lifeblood of the “real” economy nowadays, this situation must be having “real” effects as documented by the press on real time.

Conclusion: There was, back in the fall of 2008, and — although it’s eased a bit since the fall — there continues to be a credit crunch.

A Solution to the Auto Industry Mess

In Economics, Politics on December 29, 2008 at 6:50 am

Michael Moore offers a plan to deal with the auto industry troubles in ways that would advance the public interest.  I find it well-informed and sensible.

I know that, because he’s Michael Moore, a “controversial” documentary maker, serious economists and journalists — that is, economists and journalists under serious pressure to feign objectivity (objectivity of the type that is in fact impossible in a society as unequal as ours) — would have to find some fault in Moore’s logic or facts, or else.  Well, I couldn’t find anything objectionable in Moore’s plan.  Readers are of course welcome to voice their own objections (or agreement) in the Comments section.

Here is Michael Moore’s plan to deal with the auto industry disaster:

http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/message/print.php?messageDate=2008-12-03

Salih Neftci on credit risk and crisis

In Economics on December 20, 2008 at 7:23 am

salih_neftci

This is an old lecture delivered by Salih Neftci at the New School on credit risk and the crisis.  (Click the tab labeled  “Play Full Program” to see the entire lecture.)  It’s still a very useful presentation when looking back at what triggered this mess.

I took all of Salih’s courses in econometrics, macroeconomics, finance, and financial engineering at the CUNY GC.  Excellent instructor.  Nice man.  Funny jokes.  Full disclosure: He once wrote a great letter of recommendation for me that got me a finance professorship.  So, I’m very grateful to him.

In a class, I once asked him point blank: “If you are so smart, how come you are into finance and making bucks?  How come you’re not into politics, trying to change the world for good?”  That rattled him a bit.  He babbled about how some women in his family, including his mother, had all been into politics at great cost.  He then said that politics only rarely improves on things.  He then stopped himself, unhappy with his own answers, and continued the class.

That is a propos of this passage in Krugman’s latest column:

Meanwhile, how much has our nation’s future been damaged by the magnetic pull of quick personal wealth, which for years has drawn many of our best and brightest young people into investment banking, at the expense of science, public service and just about everything else?

I agree with Paul Krugman.  What a waste of our society’s dearest resources!

Krugman’s Nobel lecture

In Economics on December 10, 2008 at 11:21 am

Krugman’s Nobel lecture is on here (Windows Media Player):

http://nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=1072

His slides are here (pdf):

http://www.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/nobelslides.pdf

Salon.com interviews Krugman

In Economics, Politics on December 8, 2008 at 4:25 pm

Do not miss Salon.com’s interview of Paul Krugman.  A quick comment:

Krugman is good at clarifying for the general public what I regard as Keynes’ main insight in the General Theory, namely that specific disproportions in the economy, e.g. sectoral bubbles, dislocations in particular markets caused by unexpected shocks in technology or policy, etc., can turn into nasty economy-wide crises only because, as a result of widespread, self-reinforcing fears about future business conditions, there’s a sudden, generalized flight to liquidity.

This is a massive coordination problem.  Coordination problems are common to capitalist markets, not only — as in this case — to financial markets.  They are a manifestation of the inherent conflict at the root of every capitalist society between an increasingly interdependent economy and private ownership.  Keynes’ genius was to realize that, like other coordination problems facing the capitalists, the Gordian knot could be cut by the decisive action of the government.

In this interview, Krugman paraphrases Keynes’ “magneto” metaphor in the Great Slump — “If you’ve got electrical problems with your engine, that doesn’t mean you should junk the whole car” (I think Keynes referred to a ‘wagon’).  And then he throws this one-two punch:

It’s true that classical economics says that we should let market forces do the work; but classical economics also says that severe recessions can’t happen.  This idea that we must not intervene is based on a worldview that is refuted by the very fact that the economy is in the mess it’s in.

Insisting on this point is called for, not only because regular people have for long been bombarded with the Austrian view that recessions (and depressions) are necessary to purge or clear the dead wood that has cluttered the system, but also because some people in the left apparently buy into the argument.

Henwood and Shaikh on the crisis

In Economics, Politics on December 6, 2008 at 5:48 pm

henwoodanwarshaikh

Last Thursday, in a panel discussion at New York University, Doug Henwood and Anwar Shaikh offered their views on the ongoing economic crisis.  Their presentations were both excellent and largely complementary.  I hope the organizers of the discussion upload the video on the web for others to watch it directly.  Meanwhile, I will share a few impressions/comments on the issues involved:

[12/8/2008 UPDATE: The audio file is already available at: http://nyusociology.org/blogs/radical/2008/12/08/the-deepening-economic-disaster/]

1. Doug had an understandably skeptical view of the political opportunities opened to the left by the crisis.  One of his remarks, was that an economic crisis — with its sequels of joblessness and insecurity — could tilt people towards solidarity and collective struggle just as well as to the kind of misanthropic despair that strengthened Fascism.  This is a valid warning.  I’d just add the qualification that the very fact that, as a result of a crisis, things might tip from one extreme to the other suggests that the moment is pregnant with political opportunities for the left: the U.S. and global left.  At times like these, the actions of the left — especially actions that are thoughtfully conceived — can have large positive consequences.

2. In his introductory remarks, Doug referred to the discontent among leftists towards Paulson’s bailout plan when it was initially announced.  Doug said that, not taking some sort of action to bail out the banks, even if it involved handing money out to Wall Street, could have triggered even worse consequences to working people than the alternative.  The collapse of banks entailed serious risks for everybody.  Doug aptly alluded to the debate between Bernanke and Friedman/Schwartz on the causes and propagation mechanisms of the Great Depression of the 1930s (Anwar reminded us that we should be specific when we refer to the Great Depression, since the U.S. experienced a few of them in the late 19th century).

3. Bernanke’s reputation as an academic, which in turn led him to the Fed chairmanship, was based on his famous 1983 paper, “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,” (AER, 73-3).   In his essay, Bernanke questioned prevailing views, because they implicitly assumed perfect (neutral) financial markets.   The banks’ collapse simply echoed the fall in output or — as claimed by Friedman & Schwartz — fed the fall in output as a result of wealth effects or (in tandem with tone-deaf monetary policy moves) via the shrinkage of the money supply.  Instead, Bernanke argued compellingly, bank bankrupticies led to a credit freeze with real output negative effects.

4. At this point, Doug failed to make the crucial distinction between the collapse of banks and the collapse of banking — or the collapse of the banking system as a whole.  Even if we rule out socialism as a feasible alternative in the short run, under capitalism, existing banks and banking are by no means the same thing.  By failing to draw this distinction, Doug leaves unquestioned a key article of faith of the neoliberal doctrine, namely that banking is a business to be left to private interests.

5. As I’ve written previously on this blog, it is entirely feasible — within the confines of the U.S. capitalist economy — to dampen the effects of the credit freeze on the economy by providing direct relief to mortgage debtors.  That can be duly complemented  with alternative ways to get credit flowing into the economy, e.g. by nationalizing at least some banks (buying a controlling interest and, using the current laxity in monetary policy to expand credit to well directed social goals).  My back-of-the-envelope estimations tell me this approach would be significantly more economical and effective than the favored ones.  (In all fairness to Doug, a questioner moved him to entertain the possibility of credit unions, development banks, and other forms of banking under greater public control, but he made these remarks with due skepticism.)

6.  This leads me back to the issue above. In fluid times, when its inherent instability and antagonisms sow doubts in people’s minds on the social efficiency and equity, rationality and desirability of capitalism, Marx’s famous epigram becomes more operational than under normal conditions: Ideas become a material force when they grip the minds of the masses.   How can the proposals of the left grip the minds of the masses if we don’t even dare to entertain them publicly in the first place?  The first task of the left is to articulate the needs of people, frame them in ways compelling enough to enligthen their actions when they set themselves in political motion.  The realm of political feasibility is being expanded by the crisis.  When the reigning economic ideology (e.g. neoliberalism) has exhausted itself, people otherwise impermeable to the ideas of the left are more ready to regard them.

7. In his closing statement, Anwar remarked that we shouldn’t view the ongoing crisis as a U.S. crisis, but as a crisis of capitalism.   Today’s capitalism continues to be largely an alienated phenomenon, without a central manned direction, subject to its own inherent, spontaneous laws above and beyond the control of the so-called “Masters of the Universe.” I don’t disagree with his statement as a general methodological, abstract proposition.  In fact, just the other day, I was going to write critical comment to a recent paper by Samir Amin using an argument similar to Anwar’s.   If it weren’t for views as those espoused by Amin and others, I’d have said that Anwar’s statement was unnecessary.

8. Having said that,  there’s clearly a dimension in which this is a crisis of national hegemony — a crisis of U.S. imperialism.  The view that global capitalism is driven by spontaneous social laws doesn’t have to exclude the recognition that, on a more concrete level, some nations, states, classes, groups, and individuals wield a much greater amount of social power than the rest of the human race — and that they use it to exploit others less fortunate.    (In fairness to Anwar, he also said in his reply to a questioner that he didn’t deny that national policies significantly altered the operation of the “pure” laws of capitalism, although the latter would wind up asserting themselves, usually in the form of sudden crises.)  This asymmetry of power is at the root of capitalism and imperialism.  The issue of international hegemony is a real political dimension that the left has to ponder.  Although no given nation state exercises absolute global social control or can impunely violate the laws of motion of capitalism, the U.S. continues to dominate the world economically and politically.   As I’ve tried to argue elsewhere, imperialism is nowadays the weakest link of the capitalist chain.  Imperialism, as a form of forceful extra-economic appropriation of the social labor of poor countries for the benefit of rich countries, is in a terminal crisis.

The origins of the crisis as perceived by Anna J. Schwartz

In Economics on December 3, 2008 at 9:32 pm

anna-schwartz

Anna J. Schwartz is one of those human beings whose charm nobody who meets her personally can resist.

For more years than I’d like to admit, I took classes in the CUNY Grad Center building located on the northeastern corner of 5th Avenue and 34th Street in Manhattan.  The economics department office was located on the 5th floor, sandwiched between the offices of the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Howard Samuels Center.  So, rather frequently, one would run into this beautiful woman in her late 80s/early 90s, on the halls or at the commons.  Invariably, she’d be dressed up, elegant, and serious.   I doubt she ever missed a day of work at the NBER since she joined it at some point during WWII.

Traditionally, as it continues to do, the economics department would jointly organize a weekly-session seminar along with the NBER.  A few times, Anna would attend the sessions.  And if you took the course in American economic history, she’d occasionally lecture, particularly on the monetary history of the Great Depression.   Anna and Milton Friedman wrote what a few (the latest being perhaps Hugo Kaufmann), a bit too obsequiously for my taste, have called “the definitive monetary history of the U.S.”

I don’t think anybody ever writes any definitive history of anything.  And it’s always seemed to me that Friedman and Schwartz significantly overestimated the role of monetary policy in leading to, and failing to prevent, the Great Depression.   That, of course, doesn’t take away that Anna has the most impressive, encyclopedic knowledge of these events, knowledge that she projects splendidly in the fluency of her speech and in the surprising volume of her voice.

Yesterday evening, the European Union Studies Center organized a lecture by Anna Schwartz on the origins of the ongoing crisis.  I attended, took notes, and then, at the end, during the Q&A period, I kindly objected to one of Anna’s claims.  I expected the lecture to be an elaboration of thoughts she expressed on her well publicized October 18 Wall Street Journal’s interview blaming the Fed (Greenspan) for ushering the financial crisis and criticizing the Fed (Bernanke) for handling it the wrong way — while praising Paulson’s initial TARP.   And that’s exactly what she did in the lecture.

But I’ll share all that tomorrow, when I update this blog post.

On economists and their records

In Economics, Politics on November 28, 2008 at 12:15 pm


Krugman or Mankiw?  Mankiw or Krugman?

I say Krugman.  And here’s my argument (awaiting moderation as a comment on Krugman’s NYT blog):

With all due respect, what did Greg Mankiw and Glenn Hubbard accomplish under Bush, not for them personally, but for society? What’s the economic record of the Bush administration measured in social welfare terms? Isn’t economics ultimately about optimizing the welfare of society? Shouldn’t that criterion trump citations, publications, or “academic accomplishments” as determined by fellow economists? I can list two remarkable accomplishments by Paul Krugman off the top of my head that, in welfare terms, go much longer than any increasing-returns trade or urban economics story. Krugman opposed the invasion of Iraq. And Krugman opposed the tax cuts for the rich.

UPDATED: 12/1/2008

I’m getting a few readers linked from Greg Mankiw’s blog.  For their sake, I’ll expand on my argument just a little.

Assume arguendo that the economists’ talent is a resource with a positive value.  Since their productivity is not infinite (which, in conventional economics translates as, the economists’ talent is a scarce resource), then it is incumbent upon the economists — as the public guardians of social efficiency — to see to it that their talent is allocated to its best possible use.

(This is, by the way, an idea that Robert E. Lucas made famous with his remark on why macro economists should spend more of their thinking time on growth economics and less on business cycles.)

Which was — by far — a better way to spend the scarce talent of the economists in question, say, in the last 8 years?  Was it better to spend it promoting or opposing the war, the tax cuts for the rich, the deregulation of financial markets, the dismantling of the social safety net, etc.?

According to Stiglitz and Bilmes, the war is costing us $2 trillion plus.  That’s the conservative estimate.  To the extent the deregulation of financial markets is a factor leading to the current mess, that’s to be added to a problem that is requiring an emergency public injection of $.7 trillion plus.   I don’t have handy figures for the total cost (on social welfare) of the increase in social inequality caused by the tax cuts for the rich, social insecurity, etc. but I am sure it’s not zero.

I’m not saying that Mankiw alone did all that.  He contributed to it, willingly and knowingly.

I’m not saying that Krugman alone managed to reverse all that.  But he contributed to it with his well argued opinion.

Krugman served the public interest with his critique of the way things were mismanaged by Bush.  Mankiw, on the other hand, did a big disservice to the public by throwing his academic and intellectual weight to the sad task of propping up Bush.

Conclusion: To the extent they owe anything to society (since they both for sure stand on the shoulders of giants), we got an excellent return on Krugman.  Mankiw, on the other hand, has been a toxic asset on our balance sheet.  Let’s hope that Paulson buys it — and keeps it.

Caracas (2): Preliminary answers to Michael Lebowitz’s questions

In Economics, Politics on November 27, 2008 at 3:05 pm

On 10, 11, and 12 October 2008, the Centro Internacional Miranda organized a conference in Caracas to discuss the erupting financial crisis, with a focus on the opportunities and challenges it posed to countries in the South.  On 10 October, in one of the meetings, Michael Lebowitz formulated a few thought-provoking questions.  I quickly jotted down some tentative answers to his questions.  I hoped then to refine my thoughts further, but other pressing needs made it impossible.  My remarks are rather general, but they remain relevant.  Slightly edited, this is what I wrote then:

Michael Lebowitz said:

I have three short questions to introduce into our discussion which have been provoked by the presentations we’ve just heard. These questions are based on two assumptions: (one) capitalism does not collapse by itself and (two) in the absence of agents, subjects, popular forces, capital will sooner or later exit the crisis restructured.  My first question is how exactly can capitalism restructure itself successfully? I stress here that I’m not asking you to act as advisers for the capitalist system. Rather, I think it is important to understand the strength of the capitalist system; in other words, it’s important to respect the enemy tactically.

This capitalist crisis is not terminal, precisely because of what Michael suggests above: The active subject required to overthrow capitalism and build socialism, a united, self-educated, and coordinated global working class is yet to emerge.  Internationally, the degree of development of this collective subject is very unequal.

U.S. imperialism is something else.  U.S. imperialism is likely to be in a terminal crisis, regardless of how long it may still last.  By imperialism I mean the exploitation of poor countries by rich countries using extra-economic forms of appropriation of wealth.  We know since Hilferding and Lenin that the modern type of imperialism is turbo charged by the power of modern capitalist production.  Thus, it will remain extremely dangerous until the end, but it is also in irreversible decay, without a trace left of historical justification if it ever had one (as Marx claimed in his writings on India), with its global legitimacy exhausted.

Let alone the standpoint of the struggle for socialism, even from the standpoint of the needs of global capitalist production, imperialism under U.S. hegemony has become cost ineffective, passé.  It is in a terminal crisis.  The ultimate basis of U.S. imperialism is, of course, international inequality.  More precisely, it is the tremendous disparity in the size of the economies of the U.S. and its Western allies vis-a-vis the rest of the world.  If those differences narrow down beyond a point, the scheme stops working.

Michael is right in pointing out that global capitalism will re-structure itself if no global subject impedes the re-structuring.  The confusion, hesitation, and lack of coordination exhibited by the governments of the rich countries as the crisis erupted was temporary.

The logic of capital is dual.  On the one hand, there is competition among capitals, divisions, conflict, etc.  On the other hand, there’s the need for capitalism to reproduce itself, which in this case appears as the need for capitalism to re-structure itself.  In the face of a crisis, especially one so grave and pregnant with political opportunities for the class adversary as this one, the need of capitalism to ensure basic conditions for its re-structuring is likely to assert itself sooner rather than later.

Ideology is the easiest thing to jettison.  In fact, to the extent the doctrine of so-called “neoliberalism” is in the way of this need of capitalism to re-structure itself, the doctrine is likely to be abandoned.  That is why neoliberalism, as a doctrine that postulates “free” markets (as opposed to direct forms of collective agency), as the panacea to social problems always and everywhere (except in the production of legal and political conditions underpinning private ownership rights), is in shambles.

Some version of Keynesianism is likely to be restored, because there are not many other obvious ways for global capitalism to pull itself out of the crisis in a reasonable time frame.  I’m not talking Keynesian monetary policy, which is showing its limits, but Keynesian fiscal policy (and the Keynesian vision behind the original Bretton Woods’ plan), like the nationalization of big chunks of the banking system now in process, global economic governance, (regulated) trade of goods and financial assets at a global scale.

To me, handing the Nobel to Krugman is a symptom of this need asserting itself ideologically.  (I don’t mean that I’m not glad that Krugman, a fundamentally decent person with demonstrated sympathy to the interest of working people, got it, instead of a right winger.)  Other symptoms of this ideological re-adjustment have been visible for a while already.

Not only the ideology of neoliberalism, but the practice of U.S. imperialism as well conflicts with the need of capitalism to re-structure itself under existing global conditions.  I can list a few factors pushing U.S. imperialism into a corner:

1) the anti-imperialist rebellion in the South, with historical roots in the anti-colonial struggle, a part of which is a process of consciously building socialism, another part of which is simply a nationalist impulse with no aspirations beyond the capitalist horizon (with no impermeable membrane separating one from the other in practice);

2) the erosion of the modicum of domestic consensus required for U.S. imperialism to exist, as a result of the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and the persistent internal opposition to the war (part of which stems from a shift to the left in the social consciousness of Americans, part the result of Americans not wanting to pay the human and financial sacrifice);

3) the U.S. debt, not only public, but also private, whose counterpart is the financial and global strategic position of China and other Asian and oil-producing countries; and

4) the current financial and economic crisis, which accelerates the reckoning due to the three factors above.

The main way capitalism can re-structure itself is via fiscal Keynesianism.  In particular, the nationalization of large chunks of the financial system, e.g. banks, and the plugging of the holes created by a the decline in private consumption and investment with public spending.

But, where are the resources necessary to fund fiscal Keynesianism?  The U.S. is already indebted and, as its economy shrinks, its debt looks scarier.  At a global scale, the only way to fund an expansion in other forms of global spending is by expanding global savings (i.e. limiting global consumption).  Reducing the consumption of Americans sufficiently has political limits and defeats the effect of public spending.  At a global scale, the creation of debt money can only depreciate the currency, which in the absence of higher interest rates would only stimulate more consumption.  Hence, the kind of fiscal Keynesianism required to re-structure global capitalism is global in nature.  I call it “global Keynesianism.”  In other words, the resources held by China and the oil producing countries are effectively the re-structuring fund.

Who in the history of capitalism has funded an enterprise without claiming dividends?  Not the merchants and money capitalists that propped up the Bourbons in XVIII century France?  Not the U.S. in WWI? Etc.

So, this poses the thorniest of all issues, which is of course the distribution of the costs/benefits of the re-structuring among nations and social classes.  That depends on political strength, which depends on (broadly understood) economic strength.  Global money is a social power.  In this case, global power.

But is U.S. imperialism without a hand to play?  Certainly not.  It has military power, which counts for something.  More importantly, it still has a huge economy with enormous long-run productive potential.  This is what the creditors are pondering precisely.  It explains the fact that the flight to safe financial assets temporarily strengthens the U.S. dollar.  However, the U.S. doesn’t have the upper hand.  In theory, the U.S. could try to blackmail the rest of the world using military threats.  To paraphrase Marie Jana Korbelová (a.k.a. Madeleine K. Albright), What’s the point of having a big military if not to use it?

Well, that strategy would fail miserably.  The only upside of the U.S. debacle in Iraq is that it exposed clearly to the world (and to Americans) the miserly limits of U.S. military power.  The U.S. has more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world together, but how could it effectively blackmail China or Russia militarily with a sputtering economy and people fed up with militarism abroad and at home?  It’d destroy much more resources that it’d intend to appropriate.  That’s why the strategy would not work.  (I’m not saying it’s impossible.  Stupid people in power can do stupid things.  My point is that it would not accomplish its intended goal.)

The other available method is, of course, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, trying to impose an inflationary tax on the rest of the world.  That would be akin to the U.S. taking itself hostage, pointing a gun to its temple, and threatening to pull the trigger.  That could work partially.  It’s been working, since China and Brazil (and Russia?) have already promised to help.  But they are going to help the re-structuring from a position of relative strength.  I cannot envision the BRICs propping up global capitalism without demanding a bigger role in global economic governance and the effective dismantling of U.S. imperialism as we’ve known it.  The strategy of depreciating the U.S. dollar would lead to the most rapid evaporation of U.S. power I can think of.

The global character of today’s financial markets cuts both ways.  The U.S. cannot dissolve them unilaterally at a massive scale without hurting itself badly.  In the 1980s, the reason why many countries in South America refused to renege on the debt unilaterally was that they’d be effectively cutting themselves out of the world market.  That’s what ties the U.S. to its liabilities today.  Global money is a global power.  Under existing conditions, who’d lose more if the U.S. severed its links with the BRICS?

The BRICS are now on the creditor side of the re-structuring.  They are exposed and they have power.  They have strong nationalist impulses.  They are not building socialism now.  But, from a historical, global viewpoint, the nationalism of the BRICS is today a progressive force.  Of course, the nationalism of the BRICS is only progressive, only historically justified, to the extent its impulse effectively contributes to reducing international inequality, the most fundamental basis of imperialism and global capitalism.

I should add here that the momentary tactical advantage the South (the BRICs in particular) currently enjoy can only be turned into a permanent strategic advantage if and only if 1) these countries continue to succeed in expanding their economies, and with increasing social efficiency, necessary condition for it to build sustainable popular support, and 2) if they increase their unity, move to negotiate their interest in greater collective accord.  It’s easy to see how this connects with the struggles of socialists in these countries.

If they drop out of the sphere of influence of capitalism and try to consciously build socialism, the game changes.  If they just limit themselves to protecting their industrial development and narrowing the gaps in average productivity and standards of consumption with respect to the rich countries (whether or not this is the intention or merely an unintended byproduct of the plan to assist domestic private accumulation), they will cooperate in the re-structuring for the reasons suggested above.

What seems clear to me is that global capitalism needs to jettison U.S. imperialism, at the very least its most extreme form (unilateralism, extra-legal aggression), if not altogether.  The complete dismantling of imperialism in all its forms is of course unlikely without a stronger rebellion from below, i.e. one, two, three many Venezuelas.

My second question is how can agents and subjects act to prevent a capitalist restructuring? And who are those agents?

In the background of Michael’s questions is the reticence of Brazil and Argentina to embrace the type of economic integration proposed by Venezuela.  In the case of the U.S., I would not accept the premise, namely that U.S. workers should struggle to prevent a capitalist re-structuring.

Clearly, for workers in the U.S., the political horizon is not socialism, but a rapid way out of the crisis, i.e. a rapid capitalist re-structuring of the economy so that they end up with jobs and increased economic security.  Given political conditions, the longer it takes for the crisis to end, the worse for them.  The working people in the U.S. can only get crushed, more fragmented, politically weaker (and more susceptible to extreme right-wing ideology) under a longer crisis.

My third question is can capitalist states prevent capitalist restructuring or do they serve as agents of capitalist restructuring?

With Brazil and Argentina as the backdrop, this seems fair.  However, as I reflect on the question, it seems to me that the question begs its answer.  To the extent Brazil’s and Argentina’s states are capitalist states, they can’t go beyond the horizon of helping, taking part in, or at least allowing the re-structuring of capitalism, not only externally (something that even Venezuela can’t avoid), but domestically.

But if we remove the adjective “capitalist” (since things are in some flux in South America), the answer is, It depends on the political conditions.  If Brazilian and Argentinian workers manage to revolutionize their state, then they are enabling themselves to go beyond merely re-structuring capitalism.

I think the distinction that we have to make is to recognize that there are two paths.  The first is a capitalist path, the restructuring of capitalism. The second is a socialist path, one which creates conditions for building socialism; and one of the most significant of those conditions is creating conditions in which there is mobilization of subjective forces, masses, the accumulation of popular forces.

Once again, with Brazil and Argentina as the backdrop, this sounds fair to me.  But I’d argue here that, under some conditions (e.g. in the U.S.), the accumulation of popular forces requires not a strategy of obstructing the re-structuring of capitalism, but ensuring better conditions for the further unity, organization, and education of workers in the longer run.

Now, can U.S. workers educate themselves if they don’t struggle against the capitalist re-structuring?  Sure.  Actually, I’d argue that they cannot educate themselves if their immediate goal is the direct struggle against the capitalist re-structuring, because they can only educate themselves through struggles they actually wage.  As far as I can see, they may passively resist the re-structuring, but as individuals, not as members of a class in political motion.

As David Barkin says, the rest of the world, or Latin America in particular cannot wait until the U.S. gets its act together, meaning until it decides to reform itself and abolish imperialism.  I don’t disagree with that.  But I’d argue that the U.S. is shifting, and that this shift creates the opportunity for getting our act together.

People in the U.S. can struggle against the redistribution of the cost of the re-structuring at their expense.  That’d be the most immediate task, I’d say.  Who knows where that struggle may lead.  Ultimately, of course, the workers’ struggle to prevent the dumping of the cost of the re-structuring on their shoulders will succeed only to the extent they threaten to derail the re-structuring itself.  But we can similarly say that not even the mildest economic struggle can ever succeed in its own terms if workers don’t threaten with a bigger disruption of capitalist reproduction.  So, the argument is silly.  The point is that posing at the outset the struggle against the re-structuring as an immediate goal is wrongheaded, an empty propagandistic gesture.  It tends to lead to (what I call) sectarian responses — political reactions divorced from the immediate needs of working people.

The first path relies upon the capitalist state and reproduces illusions in capitalism; it reinforces the idea of capitalism as practical. The second path creates consciousness of the nature of capitalism; it recognizes that crisis is an opportunity, an opportunity to intensify the battle of ideas.

I guess, under some interpretation, the struggle against the redistribution of the costs of re-structuring global capitalism at their expense can be viewed as moving along the socialist path.  However, I’d just insist that it shouldn’t necessarily imply opposing the re-structuring as an immediate task always and everywhere.

The first path, the capitalist path, is the path of Mercosur and a Bank of the South that reproduces the character of  existing international agencies. The second path is the path of Alba and of a Bank of the South based on new relations building upon solidarity.

Again, I’m trying to look at things from the point of view of the U.S. workers’ interest.

Strictly business

In Economics, Politics on November 21, 2008 at 1:07 pm

I’ve been silent for a while.  Meanwhile, Barack Hussein Obama became the president elect of the United States of America.  This offers a big opportunity for this nation.  But let me address the problems that are in the way of redeeming the promise of change that Obama made.  Ultimately, as he has admitted, the reason why we voted him president is to actually implement change for us.  So, let’s talk about the economy.

Paul Krugman’s column today, in the New York Times, is a good way to introduce the topic.  Paul alludes to the ominous economic effects of the presidential transition.  The credit markets are still frozen.  We learn that Paulson’s Treasury has not yet effectively used its mandate to shore up the debacle of the financial system.  Apparently, Paulson is leaving at least half of the $700 billion bailout fund for the next administration to deploy.  Meanwhile, Detroit’s car makers — squeezed between the rock of low car sales and the hard place of low financial returns — come to Washington, hat in hand, to ask for public help.[*]  The danger is, of course, the multiplied effects that their bankruptcies would generate, regionally, nationally, and (of much less concern to U.S. politicians) globally.  No money is being offered to them yet.  The economy is in a tailspin.

What would I do, if I were Obama?

Well, if I were Obama, I probably wouldn’t have been the president elect, because — aside from other flaws I may have had as a candidate — my agenda would have been substantively different.  For example, I’d have committed myself to entirely scrapping our foreign policy and replacing it with a new one.  Not just out of Iraq with a number of ifs and buts, but out of Iraq now, or for as long as it takes an obedient military to carry out the orders of their commander in chief.  And not only a return to our old Clintonian foreign policy.  No.  I’d have offered to discard the very premises of our foreign policy since World War I or even before, because they have exhaustively proven to be contrary to the interest of regular, working- and middle-class Americans, not to mention contrary to the interest of the rest of the world.

My foreign policy would be based on the recognition of the obvious fact that the world is shrinking very rapidly, as a result of the decreasing costs of international communications and transportation.  We all know that a truly global society and culture is emerging rapidly, and that the existing, fragmented, system of national states with a thin layer of international jurisprudence is the wrong tool for the new tasks the world must execute.  Many serious problems today are truly global in scope.  Of course, environmental problems like global warming and natural resource management, but also economic and social problems, let alone migration and crime.  But stay with the economic problems, the current financial meltdown and the forces that created it (e.g. trade imbalances) are essentially global phenomena.

In the foreign policy front, I’d have proposed for our nation to try and lead a global democratic process aimed to setting up a global legal framework that would help us, citizens of the world, to collectively and properly deal with the global consequences that flow from our national lives.  The particular ways in which this global democratic process would be implemented is — of course — key, but I’d leave that to each given nation to work out, in accordance with their own conditions, needs, and priorities.  And, the U.S. being the leader of that process, I’d ensure that, while respectful of other nations, we set a high example for the rest of the world to follow.  The essential thing is that the process is democratic — as in demos=people and cratos=power, i.e. the power of the people — so that the legal framework thus emerging enjoys true global legitimacy.  If the emerging legal system doesn’t have global legitimacy, then it won’t work well in the long run, and we’ll be back to the drawing board, with worse problems, sooner rather than later.

I am convinced that the U.S. is in a good position to lead the globe in this process.  But that requires an entirely new approach to foreign policy.  The globe would have to see clearly, not by our words, but by the nature of our actions, that we are truly abandoning any and all imperialistic impulse.  I know that is a tall order, given our history.  But I have no doubt it is necessary for this nation and the world to move forward.  In other words, we would have to prove unilaterally to the rest of the world that we are not using the instruments of our foreign policy (including our economic and military weight) as a means to advance the exclusive economic interest of a narrow sliver of the business class (e.g. oil companies, military contractors, etc.) at a terrible cost, in lives and other resources, to most Americans and to the rest of the world.  Yet in other words, we would have to show the rest of the world that we are serious about global cooperation for the common good.

Perhaps the only upside of what happened to us in the last eight years (e.g. 9/11 and the fiasco in Iraq) is that, my foreign policy vision now appears more “realistic” to many more people than it would have 12 years ago (when I first shared it with a few friends and relatives).  We have seen the hard limits of going-alone, of the richest and most armed nation in the world trying to impose its interest on other countries by force, of thinking of itself in narrowly nationalistic terms.  And we have also witnessed why global markets are entirely inadequate to dealing with global externalities, that we really need global governance — democratic, because nondemocratic governance (e.g. a la IMF, World Bank, WTO, G7, or even G20) won’t cut it.

Although much better in his approach to foreign policy than Bush, I don’t think Obama is anywhere near what I envision, which — I believe — is entirely feasible, “realistic,” and — just as important — absolutely urgent.  I understand though that the okay is not necessarily the enemy of the good.  So, I appreciate what Obama represents in terms of social progress, but I believe we won’t get more than symbolic progress if we don’t keep pushing.

As far as domestic policy, I would have committed myself as a candidate to a more vigorous fight for the economic security and interest of the majority of Americans — including publicly-funded, single-payer universal health care.  This is simply another way to say that I’d have committed myself to taking decisive steps to eliminate poverty in the U.S. and drastically reduce the inequality of opportunities that plagues our social life, particularly the forms of inequality unrelated (i.e. most of them) to individual merit.  I understand that this vows would put me at odds with the interest of big money, which would have made my candidacy less likely to prevail.  But that’s because the interest of big money, on the one hand, and the interest of regular people in the U.S. and in the world, on the other hand, are at odds.

Facing the current financial meltdown, I’d have no hesitation about the need to nationalize the troubled banks, and to use them directly to expand credit (rather than just begging the banks to please pretty please loan their resources).  I’d be set to unleash public spending (no bridges to nowhere, but tightly managed investment projects with a clear, positive social return), rebuild and in many cases replace the existing infrastructure with a greener, more socially-inclusive one (yes, Virginia, social inclusion, social cohesion, etc. are also essential goods, essential public goods that markets undersupply), and rehab public education.  And that’s, not because I don’t understand that public institutions fail (just like markets fail), but because I understand that there are conditions under which the social costs of government failure (e.g. corruption, waste, etc.) are much less than the social costs of market failure (e.g. waste, corruption, unemployment, etc.).

Where would the resources for so much public spending come from?  From whomever may have them, e.g. the rich and foreigners.  Plus (large) efficiencies that would result from these very changes.  To get resources from the rich here, I’d use fiscal policy.  If the rich truly value the benefits of living in a workable society, they would have to cough up more in taxes.  In order to induce foreigners to support our economy in a manner consistent with what I wrote above, we’d have to show them how they would also benefit from our prosperity.  We’d go global Keynesian, to put it in those terms.  We’d have to reconfigure the international monetary and financial system accordingly.  But I’ll leave that topic to another day.

Again, I understand that with such an agenda, Obama would have stood little chance as a candidate.  A campaign cannot change overnight centuries of ideological brainwashing of Americans, by media, think tanks, and academia, which in turn owe themselves to big money.

So, if I were Obama… and I had to face the current transitional paralysis, likely to leave a bigger economic mess for me to handle in January, what would I do?

I would continue to talk softly, calling everybody to unite around my agenda (obviously the best for the country, as per the nation’s own vote), but I’d also be sharpening my knives.  Perhaps not me personally, but I’d be telling my chief of staff and other lieutenants, my enforcers, the muscle behind my policy push, to sharpen theirs.

Most definitely, and hopefully without having to spell it out publicly, I would make the Republicans and a few Democrats offers they could not refuse.  As subtly as I could manage, I would make clear to everybody currently in power that I am committed to using the full legal power of the U.S. to sternly prosecute any serious wrongdoing (and wrongdoing is the way of life of the political class), specially if they exhibit negligence or obstructionism in dealing with the current economic emergency.

People with large vested interests to defend, especially those who have built up their wealth and privilege with due contempt for others not as fortunate — i.e. most of them — are not really moved by the Kumbaya approach.  We, regular people, may be, but they are not.  For them, it’s not personal.  It’s business.  And so should be for Obama.  So far okay, but let’s hope that he has the heart in the right place, and that he also has it in him whatever it takes to win these battles for the good of the nation and the world.

[*] Doug Henwood recently reminded us on his listserv (LBO-Talk) that Detroit’s car makers had managed to survive this far in spite of lousy car sales, thanks to their financial dealings, mainly sales financing.  Their financial wings were effectively operating as banks.  While banking was good business, they were able to offset loses in sales.  The credit freeze is the second whammy.

Venezuela and Ecuador take joint economic steps

In Economics, Politics on October 28, 2008 at 4:18 pm

Venezuela and Ecuador take some steps in the formation of the Bank of the South and the introduction of a common regional currency. Here’s the press conference that presidents Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa held yesterday (in Spanish).

The causes of the crisis

In Economics on October 15, 2008 at 6:58 pm
crisis = danger + opportunity

crisis = danger + opportunity

Today, at work, I talked to a room packed with students and faculty, about the causes of the ongoing crisis. The slides are here:

Report on my trip to Caracas (1)

In Economics, Politics on October 15, 2008 at 2:46 pm

A week ago, I was in Caracas, at an economic conference organized by the Centro Internacional Miranda on the responses from the South to the ongoing crisis.  There, I had a chance to meet president Hugo Chávez personally.    Briefly, of course.

At the opening of the conference, Chávez gave a two-hour speech.  Extremely interesting.  The highlight of his speech (if you ask me) was a vivid description of the way in which his government managed to get Venezuela’s central bank to disgorge a portion of the country’s international reserves for economic and social development.  Quite a story!  Just imagine that, back in 2001, Venezuela had its international reserves parked at, inter alia, Lehman Bros. — like, I imagine, Mexico did until the financial giant collapsed.

From a purely logical and factual point of view, this is such a slam dunk that merely stating it is an overkill.  But here I go:

The point of any economy is the well-being of people — the more people, the better.  Thus, if people have money (e.g. as a result of the extraction and sale of natural resources from the commons), an asset with zero nominal return, or liquid fixed-income financial assets, with tiny nominal returns, then they should spend it (or invest it) in whichever gets them the highest return measured in well-being, compared to the alternatives.  (And, for the purists, well-being is measurable.  Not perfectly measurable, but roughly measurable.  No measure is perfect.)

In a Latin American country (as in an Asian or African country), with their high levels of poverty and low indicators of social development, it is self evident that the highest return on that money or liquid wealth is — of course — on the people themselves.  Or, as economists call it, on their human capital: health and education.  And social equity.  Social equity also, because existing inequities make their political and social life extremely unstable and wasteful of human welfare.  So, revolutions a la Chávez’s (or Correa’s) are the most sensible economic policies any unbiased economist could think of!

But, isn’t it true that using fiscal policy to transfer resources to the poor is inefficient in principle?  Why?  Compared to what?  “Free” markets?  How is it inefficient in principle?  That money belongs to the nation of Venezuela to begin with.  If, trough legitimate political processes, participatory democracy, those countries give themselves a government (like Chávez’s or Correa’s) that takes funds from the commons parked in financial assets and put them to higher return uses for the benefit of the commons, how is that inefficient in principle?

I’d argue that, even if a government like Chávez’s and Correa’s taxed the rich progressively (as opposed to using resources that are already public) and used revenues thus obtained to fund programs of social development, those policies would be entirely justified on the grounds of efficiency, let alone equity.

But, isn’t this type of fiscal policy inefficient in practice, as it fosters corruption and waste?   Compared to what?  “Free” markets?  Isn’t there waste of human welfare in every market failure, a vicious case of which we’ve been witnessing as of late?  So, why don’t they argue in favor of reducing the waste in the transference mechanisms or such?  No, their argument is against using public money to help the public.  That’s what underlies stories like a recent one published in the New York Times magazine about how PdVSA is being gutted out by Chávez.  (I won’t link it, but you can google it if you want to get angry.)  Therefore, they are in favor of using public money to help small groups of people who are already immensely rich.

I rest my case.

But, of course, economic debates are not only — or mainly — about logic or facts.  They are also (mainly?) about special, vested interests trying to appropriate privately the resources of the commons and using discourse, economic or political, to pull a fast one on the public.  That is why we need to belabor the point.  For regular people not willing to allow the special interests to manipulate them ideologically, logic and facts should have primacy.

Anyway, I’m not saying that was the only interesting thing about Chávez’s speech, but it was the most interesting to me.  There were two other, very interesting speakers at this event, prior to Chávez, one of them Claudio Katz, an economist from Argentina whose work we should be googling and Pedro Páez Pérez (PPP, for those who can get the economic pun), the minister of the economy of Ecuador.  (You can spot me on the first row, on a green shirt, between David Barkin, UAM-Mexico, and Venezuela’s former  minister of basic industries, Víctor Álvarez.)

Chávez’s full speech can be watched here (in Spanish). (I tried to embed the video clip, but I couldn’t do it right.)

On life and financial markets

In Economics on October 4, 2008 at 8:12 am

When I taught at Ramapo, on the first day of class, I would ask my international finance students to help me build the balance sheet for the whole global economy as if it were co-owned by the entire human race — no estimated values of course, just the items listed in the statement. The typical makeup of class would be seniors or, at least, juniors who had already taken two heavy courses in financial accounting, one or two micro courses, one or two macro courses, two courses in corporate finance, perhaps one money and banking, and at least one econometrics. Some of them worked for banks or financial firms in northern NJ or Manhattan.

The starting point was the balance sheet of a typical firm.  (We’d treat governments, nonprofits, households, individuals as “firms.”)  On the balance side, it’d have assets: cash and liquid securities, receivables and other short-term financial assets, longer-term financial assets, inventories, equipment, vehicles, buildings, and real estate. I asked them to, first, consolidate the balance sheets of all U.S. firms and then add them to the consolidated balance sheet of the rest of the world.

At this point, they would start to see how all the financial claims issued by U.S. firms and held by other U.S. firms would be on both sides of the sheet and thus dropped out. At the end, they’d have on the top of the U.S. asset side only domestically-held foreign financial assets and the different forms of U.S. productive wealth. All U.S. cash held by Americans would cancel out, because it was a liability of the U.S. government offset by the cash holdings on the asset side of Americans.

On the right hand side, they’d have the U.S.-issued financial assets held by the rest of the world, including the portion of U.S. currency not held domestically. In the rest-of-the-world balance sheet, they’d report those same U.S.-issued financial assets plus the productive wealth held by the rest of the world. On the liability side, the same things that appeared on the left hand side of the U.S. balance sheet.

At this point, the students would start to come up with the punchlines.

The next exercise was, “on the basis of what you just figured out about the global balance sheet, help me draw a diagram of the human economy overall.” First off, “What is the point of the whole human economy? What is it for?” After a bit of discussion, we’d conclude that it had to be some form of well-being or welfare. Or that’s what the economists would have us believe. (Please, economists, don’t take this as economics baiting.)

“How do people obtain well-being?” Through consumption of wealth (goods). Okay. We drew a box and labeled it “Consumption.” But wealth has to be produced before (or at the same time as) it is consumed? A box on the left hand side labeled “Production” with an arrow connecting it to the consumption box. Not all wealth produced is consumables. We labeled the arrow “Consumption Goods.” “What are the inputs to production?” If a distracted student said money, the rest of the class would correct him. “No, all money drops out when you look at the global economy.” Exactly! The items that remain in the global balance sheet! Natural resources and “capital goods.” Natural resources: an arrow labeled T (for terrum, the Latin word for land) from nowhere into the production box. “Capital goods”: an arrow coming out of production and looping back into production. The classical economists and Marx, I’d say, called them “means of production.”

“What else is required?” Something that our accountant’s global balance sheet didn’t show, because slavery is illegal. Indeed, [hu]manpower. “What else is produced when people produce wealth?” Somebody would say “garbage.” Right! Garbage, pollution, waste, noise, etc. We produce goods and bads. Goods enhance welfare. Bads reduce it. An arrow out of production into nowhere would indicate those bads. “Aside from well-being, what else is produced when people consume?” “Garbage as well.” Another arrow out of the consumption box. And labor. People replenish themselves and produce themselves as producers when they consume. An arrow from consumption looping back into the production box.

Do production generate well-being directly? Do we get some of our well-being from the things we do at work? How about the negative of well-being, misery? We produce goods and garbage, and also social garbage: “We get out of work [out of the production box] exhausted and grumpy, and then go and become aggressive drivers, bad neighbors, bad citizens.” — a female student once said. And from the consumption box? “As well, sometimes we consume and feel empty inside.” She made my point much better than I could have. The arrows pointing out of production and consumption labeled “Well-being” now had the inscription “>=< 0.”

A last push: “Do garbage get into our consumption and production boxes? Is the bad side of nature feeding back into those boxes?” Yes, the answers would pour. We live in noisy cities, breath polluted air, our products have toxic chemicals, trash entertainment, hurricanes, etc.

When we had a more or less populated diagram, I’d pause and say, “This is perhaps the broadest picture we can draw of our global economy. This is the ultimate foundation of the international monetary and financial systems. Those systems, very bulky and complex, are built on top of our production/consumption metabolism. We often lose sight of what lies underneath. So, what conclusions can you draw from these exercises?”

A shower of punchlines:

Wealth (and well-being) can only be produced the hard way, with productive wealth: labor, capital goods, natural resources. Central banks and regular banks can create money. And almost anybody can create financial assets. But that is not the same as creating actual wealth. Finance doesn’t produce wealth. It consumes wealth. Therefore it doesn’t produce well-being. “Not directly” — a student would reply — “but if financial markets transfer wealth to its best uses, then financial markets help preserve well-being.” The markets-are-efficient argument. The efficiency of financial markets can’t just be assumed. It has to be shown that they are indeed doing that job. But, in a reference to their micro courses, I’d ask: “Do markets (e.g. financial markets) always lead to an efficient allocation of resources, goods, and bads?” “No, there are market failures: monopoly, externalities, public goods, information imperfections.” Financial markets are plagued by them.

At some point, I’d show them a chart with the estimated size of the different financial markets. By comparison, the figures dwarf global GDP. Are financial markets efficient? Why are they so bloated? Remember, they use wealth, but they don’t produce it directly. Are they really giving the human race the bang for the buck? Forex markets were the biggest: spot, forwards, futures, options, swaps, not only on currencies but also on deposits (interest rates), volatility, etc. — and lots of exotics. I’d ask, “Look at what happened in Europe. What do you think would happen to the forex markets if there were a single global currency?” No need for them. They’d disappear. And no need for a course in international finance. We could be in the Bahamas instead!

Deal or no deal?

In Economics, Politics on September 30, 2008 at 5:22 pm

Yesterday, the Dow dropped 777 points in reaction to the failure of Congress to pass the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) — that is, the Bush-Paulson plan reworked by Chris Dodd and Barney Frank.  Today, the Dow recovered almost 500 points in expectation of some deal in Capitol Hill.

Of course the financial system needs to be propped up somehow, at taxpayers expense, or risk a deeper and longer recession.  If there’s no deal in Congress in the next few weeks, several financial institutions are very likely to collapse due to short term but hard to solve liquidity problems.  Interbank and all types of credit will freeze further.  The stock market could sink — Dow 5,000 anyone?  And the effects on that part of the economy that produces actual wealth (rather than financial claims over such wealth) can be huge.

Even without this financial mess, the “real” economy is already in trouble.  The statistics on output and employment are not yet terrifying, but they show clearly that the economy is sliding into a recession.  That has to do with the usual cycle, with the effect intensified by the bursting of the real estate bubble.  So, there’s a wealth effect already hitting the “real” economy.  The portion of it that comes from shrinking values of real estate assets.  As people get poorer because their real estate equity stopped functioning as — to use the expression coined by Doug Henwood — an ATM machine, they are likely to shrink their consumption spending, which is by far the largest (and typically most stable) component of the economy’s overall demand.

With the financial mess, those problems in the “real” economy compound.  We have a double whammy: 1) the credit freeze slowing down further the “real” economy and 2) the wealth effect in steroids that results from the seriously shrinking values of financial assets across the board, including corporate stocks.  The latter effect is particularly worrying because, so far, “real”-economy corporations have had, on average, rather robust balance sheets.  With 1) and 2) working in tandem, we have a whole new game.  If equity shrinks significantly, then all corporate balance sheets will suddenly appear more leveraged, right at a time when rolling over corporate debt is become more difficult.

I’m going over the risks of the no deal just to convince myself that, all said and done, the choices may not be as stark as they appear.  I mean, no deal now doesn’t have to mean no deal at all.  It is just no deal for now.  I mean, as of today, Obama is expected to win the election.  As we know, expectations can change, as they depend on the information we have now, and the information gets updated as time elapses.  But if there’s no deal, the economy is not likely to improve and probable voters are not likely to blame Obama and the Democrats for it.

So, here’s the thing: In principle, yes, it’s better to face now these risks and try to preempt a deeper and longer recession by passing the TARP deal as is, or almost as is.  However, in the long run, this “better” may turn out to be only “marginally better.”  Why?  Because it’s likely that, in November, Obama and the Democrats running for Congress will prevail, which will drastically alter the political landscape.

Come January (or even November) the Democrats will be in a completely different position, thus having more clout to shape up expectations in the economy and, more importantly, to shape the actual bank rescue deal.  It seems to me that the Democrats in power would be more willing, especially under active popular pressure, to undertake the (partial) nationalization of troubled banks, a much better approach than buying off toxic assets at some above-market arbitrary price in the hope that 1) the banks are thus re-capitalized and 2) the Treasury is at some point able to dump them in the market at a decent premium.

Krugman, DeLong, Galbraith, et alia have aptly argued in favor of the Sweedish approach to rescuing the banks and there’s no reason to belabor that point here.  I could add (a bit vaguely, I admit) that Mexico’s own experience is consistent with their argument.  In 1982, Mexico nationalized the banking system.  Then, during the Salinas administration, the banks were sold back to private capitalists.  Even though the process was corrupt to the core, it seems that Mexico’s treasury didn’t do too bad on the deal.  (I’ll sound like Palin vis Couric, but I should get back to ya on this.  Need to look for references to this, as I’m sure there are studies that show it.  My 3 readers: please help.)

Then, in 1995, as a result of the Tequila crisis, Mexico’s private banks got again in deep trouble.  This time, the government of Ernesto Zedillo used the National Fund for Savings’ Protection (FOBAPROA), an institution created by Carlos Salinos in the spirit of the FDIC, to assume the banks’ liabilities that resulted from the insolvencies and bankruptcies following the peso plunge.  Altogether, the FOBAPROA assumed about 50 billion USD of banks’ bad debt, and that debt was later (in 1998) formalized as part of Mexico’s public debt.  Aside from the outright fraud and corruption involved in FOBAPROA’s operations, duly documented by the political opposition in Mexico, the deal was not nearly as good from the viewpoint of Mexico’s treasury as the 1982 nationalization.

I wish I could be more specific about the reasons why one approach worked and the other didn’t, but at some point one has to be humble and admit that ignorance is no valid argument.

Anyway, the main point I wanted to make today is this: Sometimes it’s better to have a good fight than a bad settlement.

Krugman’s column

In Economics on September 29, 2008 at 12:21 pm

In his latest column, Krugman reminds us of a solid reason not to vote for McCain in November: Phil Gramm might be his Treasury secretary.

Larry Summers: It may work out well

In Economics on September 28, 2008 at 7:46 pm

Larry Summers’ column in the Financial Times.  Now that the Paulson proposal has been amended, it may turn out to be okay — he opines.  I don’t know the details of the proposal to be submitted to the two houses in the next few days.  So, I have no opinion yet about it.

What works and what doesn’t

In Economics on September 28, 2008 at 9:28 am

Brad DeLong advocates a Swedish approach (taking over the banks) versus a Paulson-Dodd-Frank plan not backed up by the Republicans.  On his most recent blog entry, Krugman agrees that’d be the choice of last-resort.

To understand the case of Sweden (1992), you may want to read this article in the New York Times or, if inclined to read more technical stuff, this NBER paper by Maurice Obstfeld.

The IMF has a report (pdf) out on what works and what doesn’t in bailouts.  Thanks to Joanna Bujes for the lead.

Joseph Stiglitz: a better bailout

In Economics on September 28, 2008 at 9:12 am

Chances are the 3 people following my blog have already read the latest by Joseph Stiglitz on The Nation.  If not, here it is.

Debate watch party for me, panel discussion for you

In Economics on September 26, 2008 at 2:15 pm

I was going to type a few thoughts in defense of the spirit of my rescue plan.  But we are having a Debate Watch Party at home tonight, and need to go shopping for munchies and beverages, and pick up my son at day care.  Since I cannot just leave like that, here’s the YouTube video of the panel discussion on the financial crisis held at Princeton on 9/23/2008 (picked up at Krugman’s blog).  Enjoy!

Crisis on Wall Street

James Galbraith on the bailout

In Economics on September 24, 2008 at 3:25 pm

Today, rushing to my next class, I’m just going to channel James K. Galbraith’s short interview with Harpers.  Enjoy and leave comments.

My rescue plan

In Economics on September 23, 2008 at 11:28 am

Take a look at Krugman’s 4 step description of the crisis.  Krugman says Paulson is trying to contain the mess at step 4 (using $700 billion over 2 years), while a better approach (Krugman’s) would be to act on step 2.

I can beat them both.  I think a sensible rescue plan should work on step 1.  That will make it more effective, equitable, and inexpensive.

According to a 2007 study by the Chicago Fed authored by S. Agarwal and C.T. Ho, the estimated face value of outstanding subprime loans in 2007 was $1.5 trillion.  (I’ve seen other estimates at around $1.3 trillion, but let’s not quibble with details.)  According to some sources, recent subprime delinquency rates nationally average 24% or so.  The Mortgage Bankers Association estimates 19% subprime delinquency in its latest survey (thanks Doug Henwood and raghu for the leads) while the Chicago Fed study puts the rate at 15%, but let’s assume 25% delinquency.  The exposed portion of those outstanding subprime mortgages amounts to $375 billion.   The number of households involved is 2.5 million, under the assumption that the national average price of a subprime housing unit is $150,000.

If these calculations are even roughly accurate, the Treasury could — not buy those assets from the financial firms that hold them, directly or as underlying of derivative assets, but — locate the original issuers of the mortgages (the subprime borrowers) and help them make the monthly payments for the next 10 years.  In 10 years, the borrowers will have enough equity to fend for themselves.  And if the subprime borrowers are expected to service their loans normally over the next 10 years, then the financial firms that acquired securities backed by those mortgages will have capital to function, service their own liabilities, continue to provide credit to the economy, and overall perform the wonderful things they are known to always do for our social good.

Note that the Treasury doesn’t need to come up with $375 billion cash upfront.  They just need to service a relatively small annuity with a total payment adding up to whatever is required to help those borrowers meet their payments on time over the next 10 years.  Clearly, the present value of that annuity would be much less than $375 billion.  If we say it’s $100 billion, we’d very likely be exaggerating.  But let’s exaggerate and say it’s so.

Still, should the Treasury give away $100 billion to 2.5 million poor families who dared dream own a house?  I am not going to make the “populist” argument that doing so is better than handing $700 billion to a few hundreds of shareholders and creditors of broke financial firms over 2 years (I’m sure that the $700 billion would not be the end of the Paulson plan, just like Wolfowitz’s $60 billion budget estimate wasn’t the total cost of the Iraq war).  Giving money to people in need, of course, creates horrible moral hazard, which in turn erodes the basis of our civilization.  When in distress caused by a disaster not of their making, people would grow accustomed to receiving the solidarity and support of the rest of society and, thus, would start to behave in self-destructive ways.  As we know, only the rich have the moral fortitude to properly use government subsidies: the bigger the subsidies, the more morally they behave.  So, no.  There would be a quid pro quo, an upside to taxpayers.

Clearly, our economy and fisc underproduce key public goods and — as a result — the quality of our life suffers.  Two of those goods are public education and public health.  Clearly, if more Americans are educated and healthy, the rest of us benefit greatly.  They would be more likely to be better coworkers, neighbors, citizens, etc.   It turns out that, by helping those people the government would have tremendous leverage over them.  Thus, the government could condition the financial help on their committing to sending their children to schools (all the way to college), and to schedule regular visits to the dentist and the physician.  They themselves would commit to attending vocational school, if of age.  Etc.  That would make our society much more livable at their expense.

But, how would those schools and clinics be funded?  They may not even exist.  Let’s see.  Say that the present value of locating the borrowers and managing the annuity fund to help them service their loans over the next 10 years is $20 billion.   Again, I’m exaggerating.  Now add that to the present value of the annuity, $100 billion.  That’s $120 billion altogether.  Take the first year of the Paulson plan: $350 billion.  Subtract those $120 billion from them.  You have a remainder of $180 billion.  That’d be more than enough to build and fund those schools and clinics.  How do I know?  Based on the estimated present value of my family dental and medical plan (Oxford, using a discount rate of 5% p.a. and deeming these plans perpetuities, i.e. making premium payments not only over a lifetime but forever, as any decent government would do) , I estimate that giving good dental and medical care to 2.5 million people and their families would require less than $75 billion (present value).  That’s health care.  Education could use up the rest.  Luckily, $120 billion would even leave change to cover with medical and dental services other segments of the currently uninsured population.

With about half the money Paulson wants us to give him, we can get the financial system back in shape and generate a substantial amount of public good at the expense of those reckless subprime people who started it all.

You are welcome.

Who pays for the Paulson-Bernanke Plan? It’s complicated

In Economics on September 21, 2008 at 12:13 pm

I just posted this long comment on Paul Krugman’s blog.  It’ll appear in a few days.  They are always lagging behind.

*  *  *

What is the effective incidence or ultimate distributional effects of the Paulson-Bernanke rescue plan?

The argument that the median household benefits from rescuing the financial institutions is not absurd.  If we don’t rescue them, they’ll drag down the whole economy.  Although a growing economy doesn’t necessarily benefit the average household (we’ve seen in the last few years, the gains from productivity going almost exclusively to the top), economic contractions have a way of being even worse for regular people.

That would be the growth/efficiency argument in favor of rescuing the financials.  But how about the (related but distinct) equity argument?  Who wins, who loses?  The devil must be in the details.

As I understand it, a public entity is being proposed to buy out the bad assets in the financials’ balance sheets.[*]   At what price?  How are they going to price them?  There’s no market for them.  The public entity (the USAFobraproa, as I call it, because it’s like Mexico’s Fobaproa after the 1994-5 Tequila crisis) will be the market maker for those assets.

For all practical purpose, the effective, current market price of those assets is next to zero.  That’s why those financials are in deep.  If the public entity paid for them their current market price, the banks would get no rescue.  So, that can only mean that taxpayers are going to pay a price above their current market price.  How much above?  Well, apparently, $700 billion for them all.  The stockholders of banks gain, we lose.

Not unlikely, but not necessarily either.  Because there’s this self-fulling prophecy thing.  If, indeed, the financials collapse and they drag down the entire economy, then indeed those assets (say, mortgages) are garbage, because the economy will not help people service them.  On the other hand, if the financials are rescued (regulated and monitored in their future dealings), then the economy may improve and help people service their obligations, thus making those assets more valuable than currently deemed, which may even turn out a profit to taxpayers.

Can somebody please measure all this stuff and straighten things out for me?  Thanks.

[*] Paulson said yesterday that, aside from those toxic assets, “our” (speak for yourself, man) financial firms are otherwise “financially sound.”  How do we assess the financial soundness of a firm but by looking at the predominant assets in their balance sheets?  That’s like saying that, aside from a person being lazy, duplicitous, and cowardly, his character is otherwise sound.  But I digress.

How to prevent what just happened

In Economics on September 21, 2008 at 12:12 pm

Here’s an article that Joseph Stiglitz published on CNN online before the Paulson-Bernanke plan was announced.  So, it’s a bit outdated, although not really.

Fobaproa al estilo estadounidense

In Economics on September 21, 2008 at 12:11 pm

Para los mexicanos con memoria e interesados en entender, el plan de rescate diseñado por Paulson y Bernanke es un Fobaproa al estilo estadounidense.  Es decir, en primer lugar, muchísimo más grande.  Otra diferencia importante es que el balance de Fobaproa lo han tenido que pagar (y lo van a tener que seguir pagando) los mexicanos, y prácticamente sólo ellos.  En cambio, los pasivos de este plan de rescate van a recaér no sólo en nosotros aquí, sino también en ustedes allá.  A menos que el resto del mundo organice una muy necesaria rebelión monetaria y financiera global.  Aquí hay algunas ideas sensatas sobre lo que el resto del mundo podría hacer.  Y aquí pueden ver básicamente el mismo argumento en láminas tipo PowerPoint (en realidad pdf).  Suerte.

All in this together? On decoupling

In Economics on September 21, 2008 at 12:09 pm

In this article, FT’s journalists Guha, Giles, Atkins, and Pillin write:

“Yet some experts still doubt the ability of the big emerging economies to substitute domestic demand for exports.

““We just don’t know how easy it will be for them to pull this off,” says one former policymaker. He worries that China and its peers may either slow more sharply than anticipated or reaccelerate too quickly, igniting inflation at home and in commodity prices, before they are forced to slam on the brakes again, with potentially global consequences.”

At this time, nobody knows for sure whether the rest of the world will follow the U.S. in a painful (and long lasting) recession.   It depends on how the rest of the world plays its hand.  However, as far as China is concerned, the worries of that mysterious ‘policymaker’ may be largely unfounded.  As far as the eye of a Western economist can see, China’s government is not very likely to allow for a substantial deceleration.  My friend Oscar Galindo (and my own reading of China’s experience of the last five years) has persuaded me that the Chinese have problems, but also an ample (political) degrees of freedom to keep growing.  That’s for the time being.  Moreover, the Chinese are all Keynesians nowadays.  Decades of rapid growth (with a host of dislocations, no doubt) have given the government some political capital.  So, I expect them to switch their emphasis from exports to trade diversification, domestic investment, local development, greater social equity, and the environment.

A propos of trade diversification, if Russia, India, and Latin America continue to expand their economic ties, the “decoupling” story that the FT reporters pooh pooh in this article as “naive” may turn out to be spot on.  Journalists present a strawman version of the “decoupling” argument.  On this very idea, I posted a comment on Paul Krugman’s blog:

In case you can’t find my comment, here it is [slightly ammended]:

# 6. August 24th, 2008 12:10 am

Originally, if my memory helps, decoupling didn’t mean that poorer countries (say China or Brazil) would [be] escaping the U.S.’s altogether. It just meant hedging or insuring. This was, I believe, the idea in Ricardo Caballero’s paper at the 2002 AEA meeting in Washington, DC, where he introduced the idea normatively.

So, if I remember correctly, it only meant that the ups and downs of the cycle in the rich countries wouldn’t hurt poorer countries, except to the extent the ups and downs are *systemic*. Obviously, the U.S. is a huge part of “the system.” In that sense, exposure to systemic risk is necessarily exposure to the U.S. There’s no way around that. All those countries could do is lower their betas.

But if the premise is that decoupling requires poorer countries shedding all risk (including systemic risk), then the argument is silly. It’s impossible. Decoupling is refuted by assumption.